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Has Mighty Casey Struck Out?:
Societal Reliance and the Supreme
Court's Modern Stare Decisis Analysis
by TOM HARDY*

Introduction
Recent changes in the Supreme Court's composition have
created some concern about how Chief Justice Roberts's and Justice
Alito's views on stare decisis will effect the Court.' The principal
controversy has been about how the newly appointed Justices will
view Roe v. Wade, given that the Court-in recent cases-has found
fault with Roe's legal underpinnings and factual conclusions.2 At their
respective Judiciary Committee confirmation hearings, thennominees Roberts and Alito both asserted that they would give
precedents, like Roe, stare decisis effect unless special justifications
existed for overruling them.3 The special justifications analysis is of
relatively recent vintage, and has endured some harsh criticism. The
furor surrounding the special justifications analysis focuses on the
credence the analysis gives to what may be termed "societal reliance."

J.D. 2007, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.A. 1997,
History, Washington University in St. Louis. I would like to thank my wife
Amelia and my family, as well as the editorial board of Hastings Constitutional
Law Quarterly for helping to bring this project to fruition.
*

1. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearings on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be
ChiefJustice of the United States, 109th Cong. 549-555 (2005) (responses of Judge John G.
Roberts, Jr., to written questions of Sen. Biden) [hereinafter Roberts Hearings];
ConfirmationHearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States, 109th Cong. 2-5 (2006) (opening statement by
Sen. Specter, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm.) [hereinafter Alito Hearings].
2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Roberts Hearings, supra note 1, at 550; Alito Hearings, supra note 1, at 775
(testimony of Judge Samuel A. Alito).
[591]
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"Societal reliance" means how much the public or culture-at-large has
come to rely on a particular precedent.
This Note looks at the Court's special justifications analysis and
at the relative weight it gives to societal reliance. Part I presents a
brief history of the Court's stare decisis analysis. Part II examines the
continuing evolution of the modern special justifications analysis.
Part III lays out three critiques of the analysis by constitutional
scholars. Part IV examines the Court's revisitation of Roe in Planned
Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey, in light of the
criticism.4 Part V does the same for the Court's upholding of the
Miranda warning in Dickerson v. United States5 and its more recent
decision in Lawrence v. Texas 6 to overrule a prior decision that
allowed the criminalization of sodomy. Part VI, compares the
modern approach to that used in a line of cases where the Court
upheld Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption. I conclude that
the inclusion of societal reliance in the special justifications gives the
Court the flexibility it needs to address complex constitutional issues,
while its insistence on a list of other countervailing factors provides
greater guarantees of well-reasoned decision-making than the Court's
previous stare decisis analysis.
I. Overview of Stare Decisis
While a full history of the stare decisis doctrine would be
impracticable here, it is necessary to offer an overview of the doctrine
and how it has developed to its current form.7 Since its first concrete
articulation in the Taney Court, the doctrine has been applied to both
constitutional precedents and those involving interpretations of
statutes.8 The Taney Court applied the same stare decisis effect to

4.
5.
(1966)).
6.
7.

505 U.S. 833 (1992) (declining to overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
530 U.S. 428 (2000) (declining to overrule Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
For a more detailed and complete history of stare decisis, see Thomas R. Lee,

Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52
VAND. L. REv. 647 (1999).

8. Id. at 717-19. Lee notes "[tihe Marshall Court apparently perceived no stare
decisis significance in the constitutional or statutory nature of a precedent." The
possibility of a distinction only arose in the Taney Court as the earlier Court's body of
constitutional precedents grew and thus were more often questioned. Id. at 712-13. Note
that we are speaking here of horizontal stare decisis and not vertical stare decisis; inferior
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decisions involving constitutional issues as it did to statutory
interpretations.9 Indeed, not until Justice Brandeis' dissent in Burnet
v. Colorado Oil & Gas Co., early in the twentieth century, did the
modern distinction between the two kinds of precedents appear."' In
Burnet, Justice Brandeis noted:
[S]tare decisis is not... a universal and inexorable
command. The rule of stare decisis... is not inflexible.
Whether it shall be followed or departed from is a question
entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again
called upon to answer a question once decided.... Stare
decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is
more important that the applicable rule of law be settled
than that it be settled right .... This is commonly true even
where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided
correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving
the Federal Constitution, where correction through
legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has
often overruled its earlier decisions.
This rationale became the "overruling rhetoric" that the modern
Court cites when faced with the question of whether to overrule an
existing precedent.12 The Court first adopted this approach in 1944
with its decision in Smith v. Allwright.3 But the
Court continues to
4
cite Justice Brandeis's view to the present day.'
Why did the Court's approach to stare decisis change? It
appears to have been due as much to practical considerations as to an
ideological shift."s In the twentieth century, the Court had more
opportunities to address the distinction between constitutional and
courts in the United States have, of course, always recognized the binding effect of highercourt rulings.
9. Id. at 718-19.
10. 285 U.S. 393, 405-13 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). As Lee notes, however, the
notion that the two types of precedent deserve different treatment dates back at least to
Justice Strong's opinion in Knox v. Lee (The Legal Tender Cases), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457
(1871), though Justice Strong's views were not adopted by any later decisions until Smith.
Lee, supra note 7, at 720-22.
11. 285 U.S. at 405-06 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
12. William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional Stare
Decisis: Casey, Dickerson and the Consequences of PragmaticAdjudication, 2002 UTAH. L.
REV. 53, 59.

13. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
14. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 75 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 556 (2002); State Oil
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997).
15. See Lee, supra note 7, at 649-50.
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statutory precedents because more constitutional precedents came up
for consideration than in the previous century. 6 By contrast, the
nineteenth-century Court "often focused its efforts on important
matters involving property rights." 7 The shift from property and
commercial litigation to constitutional issues, Thomas R. Lee
contends, was the major reason for its development of rules for
overruling precedents-a Court that mainly considers only one kind
of case does not need to distinguish those cases from those it rarely
considers. 8 Though an increasing number of opportunities for
deciding constitutional issues explains why the Court felt it necessary
to develop a distinction between statutory and constitutional
precedents, it does not explain why it took the approach that it did.
The factors that the Court used throughout its history to decide
whether to overturn its precedents remained constant until very
recently. The principal consideration for the early Court in deciding
whether to give stare decisis effect to a prior decision on any issue
was "whether reversal would 'disturb' any 'rights of property' or
'interfere with any contracts heretofore made."" 9 We may restate this
generally as an emphasis on economic reliance interests. William S.
Consovoy identified two other factors involved in the Court's analysis
of precedents: efficiency and "equality and legitimacy."2 ° The
efficiency concern is articulated as the value of judicial economy over
that of constantly reevaluating prior decisions, and may involve
valuing the settled rule over a new, more "correct" rule for the sake
of saving time and resources. 2' The equality and legitimacy factor
involves the Court's concern that it should appear less like the creator
of law and more like the interpreter of law. 2 Justice Brandeis clearly
had these factors in mind in his Burnet dissent.23
These
conceptualizations of stare decisis have continuing relevance for the
Court and have influenced the development of the special
justification analysis.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 718 (quoting The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
443, 458-59 (1851)).
20. Consovoy, supra note 12, at 61.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 61-62.
23. 285 U.S. at 405-06 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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However, the Court's recent development of the special
justifications analysis has added some new elements to the mix. Most
particularly, the Court has been more willing to take into account
non-economic forms of reliance." Because the Court has adopted
Justice Brandeis' assertion that constitutional precedents are subject
to a different level of deference than statutory precedents, the weight
the Court should accord non-economic reliance has become a topic of
considerable debate. 5
H. The Evolving Special Justifications Doctrine
Reliance is the most confusing element of the Court's stare
decisis analysis, but only because many of the other elements in the
analysis have not yet been clearly elucidated. Given that the special
justification analysis is only partly-formed-and deliberately so-and
that only a few cases have expressly employed it, there are limits on
the certainty with which the relative weights of its elements can be
afforded.
The Court first mentioned the special justification analysis in
Arizona v. Rumsey, though it did not articulate the content of the
analysis.26 Instead, the first detailed description of the analysis from
the Court came in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, in which the
Court considered whether 42 U.S.C. § 1981 applied to private as well
as public contracts.27 Justice Kennedy's opinion cited the greater
deference given statutory precedents and outlined the special
justifications that may override such deference: (1) developments in
the law since the precedent; (2) unworkability of the rule decided in
the precedent; and (3) inconsistency with the "prevailing sense of
justice" among the public.28
Reliance is not specifically mentioned in Justice Kennedy's
analysis. 29 However, it is implicit in his other justifications. The
extent to which a precedent influences-or does not influence-the

24. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992).
25. See Burnet, 285 U.S. at 405-06 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
26. 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984). The Court simply stated that "[a]lthough adherence to
precedent is not rigidly required in constitutional cases, any departure from the doctrine of
stare decisis demands special justification." Id.
27. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
28. Id. at 173-75.
29. See id.
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development of the law is a gauge of the legal community's reliance
on the old law. Justice Kennedy's second justification, unworkability,
also contains a component of reliance, in that an unworkable legal
rule is unlikely to be relied upon.'
The third justification, inconsistency with the public's
understanding of justice, adds a new ingredient-societal reliance-to
the mix. Emery G. Lee points out that this justification is related to
Justice Brandeis's concern in his Barnet dissent with "how changed
facts and circumstances, or changed understandings, can undermine
the legitimacy of a precedent and justify its overruling."'" Stated in a
slightly different way, the Court's examination of the public's
understanding of justice focuses on whether the precedent's view of
justice conflicts with the public's, such that overruling it would not
create a discord between law and common understandings of justice.
Thus, the Court determines whether upholding a precedent would be
in accord with the public's reliance on a particular understanding of
justice. Interestingly, Justice Kennedy's formulation of reliance on
precedent is not primarily concerned with economic reliance, but
rather with the effect-or lack of effect-of the precedent on
common practices and understandings.32 This new tone in stare
decisis analysis is more definitively sounded in Planned Parenthoodof
Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey, discussed infra.33
The special justifications analysis did not immediately become3
the accepted vocabulary for the Court. In Payne v. Tennessee,
decided two years after Patterson, Chief Justice Rehnquist overruled
two precedents without offering special justifications. As Emery Lee
argues, "Payne was the turning point for the 'special justifications'

30.

All of Justice Kennedy's justifications hinge on the extent to which intervening

historical or technological changes have changed fundamental legal doctrine, made a
precedent unworkable, or changed the common understanding of justice. Reliance tends
to interact with these justifications as a counterweight.

For example, if technology has

made a precedent utterly unworkable, reliance on the precedent may be irrelevant to the
issue of workability. The same is true if there has been an intervening change in legal or
common understanding, in that a significant change in either may render moot any
consideration of reliance interests.
31. Emery G. Lee 111, Overruling Rhetoric: The Court's New Approach to Stare
Decisis in Constitutional Cases, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 581, 599 (2002).
32.
33.
34.

See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 173-75.
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
501 U.S. 808 (1991). Chief Justice Rehnquist does note that the holdings of the

two prior cases had proven difficult to apply, and thus indirectly offers unworkability as a
justification for overruling. Id. at 828-30.
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theory of stare decisis," if only because Justice Marshall's dissent in
the case pointedly argued that the Court's legitimacy depended on its
ability to adduce consistent justifications for overruling established
precedents.35
The joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeast
Pennsylvania v. Casey, decided in 1992, indicates that the Court took
Justice Marshall's dissent in Payne to heart.36 This landmark decision,
which upheld Roe v. Wade, does not use the term "special
justification," but the joint opinion does lay out four "pragmatic
considerations" the Court must look at when deciding whether to
overrule a precedent, even if members of the Court believe it to be
erroneously decided.37 Three of the four considerations correspond to
Justice
Kennedy's
justifications:
unworkability,
intervening
developments in the law, and changes in facts or circumstances.38 The
fourth factor, however, returns to the tradition of stare decisis
jurisprudence prior to Patterson: "[W]hether the rule is subject to a
kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation."3 9 This aspect of Casey is controversial because the joint
opinion chooses to view reliance outside of its traditional economic
context. Instead of the traditional economic reliance argument, the
joint opinion notes:
Flor two decades of economic and social developments,
people have organized intimate relationships and made
choices that define their views of themselves and their places
in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the
event that contraception should fail. The ability of women to
participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives....
The Constitution serves human
values, and while the effect of reliance on Roe cannot be
exactly measured, neither can the certain cost of overruling

35. Lee, supra note 31, at 603; see also Payne, 501 U.S. at 853-54 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("If this Court shows so little respect for its own precedents, it can hardly
expect them to be treated more respectfully by the state actors whom these decisions are
supposed to bind.").
36. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
37. Id. at 854.
38.

Id.

39. Id.
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Roe for people who have ordered their thinking and living
around that case be dismissed. '
The Court stresses both economic and social developments.
Casey thus expanded Patterson's special justification doctrine to
include an overt reliance component, while also expanding the
traditional definition of reliance beyond commerce into a social
context.
The Court tacitly employed the special justifications analysis in
Dickerson v. United States,42 in which the Court revisited its opinion in
Miranda v. Arizona.43 Following the Miranda opinion, Congress
passed a statute in 1968 that required only a "totality of the
circumstances" test for admissibility of confessions; a direct reaction
to the Court's recommendation of the more stringent Miranda
warning. Dickerson thus presented the Court with a choice between
upholding its precedent or allowing Congress to supercede it. The
majority decision, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, states that the
Court must have a special justification for overruling a precedent.
Surprisingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist cites neither Casey nor
Patterson for this proposition, but instead draws on United States v.
InternationalBusiness Machines Corp. Moreover, the opinion does
not directly cite the four special justifications laid out in Casey, noting
instead that the Miranda warning "has become embedded in routine
police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of
our national culture."' 6 However, as Emery G. Lee pointed out the
logic of the opinion implicates at least three of the four Casey
justifications-reliance, development in the law, and unworkability"

40. Id. at 857.
41. Id.
42. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
43. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000), invalidated by Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442-44.
45. Dickerson, 384 U.S. at 443 (citing United States v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 517
U.S. 843, 856 (1996)). The Int'l Business Machines Corp. opinion cites neither Casey nor
Patterson, as well, instead relying on a rather perfunctory statement that the Court "has
always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some 'special
justification."' Int'l Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. at 856. (quoting Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 833, 842 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring)).
46. Dickerson, 384 U.S. at 443.
47. Lee, supra note 31, at 614-15. Lee posits that Chief Justice Rehnquist wished to
avoid tying his opinion to Casey, in which he dissented, because of his belief that Casey's
analysis would hurt the Court's legitimacy. Id. at 616.
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Most significantly, Chief Justice Rehnquist's invocation of "national
culture" indicates the Court takes societal reliance seriously.
Lawrence v. Texas tested just how serious the Court was about
applying the special justifications analysis in general and societal
reliance in particular.8 In Lawrence, the Court reexamined its
holding in Bowers v. Hardwick,49 which upheld a state law
criminalizing sodomy. The Bowers Court had mainly relied on its
findings that "[p]roscriptions against [sodomy] have ancient roots,"
and therefore are not prohibited by traditional understandings of due
The Lawrence Court, however, looked to different
process.'
historical evidence, which showed that "laws targeting same-sex
couples did not develop until the last third of the 20th century." 1
Lawrence, in overruling Bowers, did not explicitly employ Casey's
four special justifications, but its analysis tacitly relies on them. For
instance, the Court invokes changes in facts or circumstances when it
notes that "the deficiencies in Bowers became... apparent in the
years following its announcement," as fewer states prohibited
homosexual conduct or enforced their laws against it. 2 Further,
Bowers is doctrinally out of step with decisions like Casey that
recognize a right to personal autonomy in intimate matters, and thus
intervening changes in the law had weakened its holding.53 The Court
also notes that Bowers proved unworkable, in that the laws it upheld
served as "an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres."' 54 As
such, it failed in practice to protect homosexuals. The coup de grace,
however, was that Bowers' anomalous due process holding created
uncertainty about the law. The Court placed heavy emphasis on the
fact that "there has been no individual or societal reliance on Bowers
of the sort that could counsel against overturning its holding once

48. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
49. 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
50. Id.
51. 539 U.S. at 570.
52. Id. at 573.
53. Id. at 573-75. The Court notes that "[w]hen our precedent has been thus
weakened, criticism from other sources is of greater significance," and goes on to note that
legal scholars have largely disapproved Bowers' reasoning and "historical assumptions."
Id. at 576.
54. Id. at 575.
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there are compelling reasons to do so."" Thus, Lawrence employs the

special justifications analysis, even if it does not acknowledge it is
doing so.
Given that Chief Justice Rehnquist (who authored Dickerson)

and Justice O'Connor (who co-authored the joint opinion in Casey)
are no longer on the Court, the status of the special justifications
analysis is in some doubt. At least one recent case, however,
indicates that the Court is likely to retain at least the form of the
special justifications analysis. In Randall v. Sorrel,56 for instance, a
plurality of the Court declined to overrule Buckley v. Valeo57 after
expressly discussing the special justifications.58 Though only three

Justices agreed with this portion of the opinion, it is notable that two
of them were Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.

9

Thus, there is

some indication that the Court will not abandon the special
justifications analysis.
III. Has the Court Gone Wrong?: Some Recent Arguments
Despite their differences, one thing is clear from Casey,
Dickerson, and Lawrence: The Court is now free to consider noneconomic reliance in deciding whether to overrule a precedent. This
more inclusive attitude has caused some concern on the part of
scholars who feel the emphasis on societal reliance will have negative

effects on the Court's legitimacy and jurisprudence. However, the
scholars disagree on just what those effects may be.

55. Id. at 577. The Court somewhat controversially takes the pulse of international
law on homosexual sodomy, and notes that "the right the petitioners seek in this case has
been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries" and that
"there has been no showing that in this country the governmental interest in
circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent." Id. By looking to
the views of "a wider civilization," the Court in some sense is defining "societal reliance"
in the broadest possible way. Id. at 576.
56. 126 S.Ct. 2479 (2006).
57. 424 U.S. 1, 54-58 (1976) (holding that limits on campaign expenditures violate the
First Amendment).
58. Randall,126 S.Ct. at 2489-90.
59. Chief Justice Roberts joined in Justice Breyer's opinion, while Justice Alito joined
it only in part. Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion, argues that the respondents in the
case did not "discuss the doctrine of stare decisis or the Court's cases elaborating on the
circumstances in which it is appropriate to reconsider a prior constitutional decision." Id.
at 2500 (Alito, J., concurring). Thus, Justice Alito seems to require petitioners and
respondents to state a case for overruling a precedent in terms of the special justifications
analysis as a prerequisite to the Court's willingness to even consider doing so. Id.
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A. Mark Tushnet
Mark Tushnet criticizes what he calls the "cultural theory of stare
decisis," as typified by the Casey joint opinion. 6' In Tushnet's view,
cultural preferences are legitimate limits on the actions of the
executive and legislative branches. Tushnet argues:
Treating culture as a constraint on overruling places
substantial limits on the Court's ability to take a leading role
in changing one constitutional order into another. For
culture, in some of its dimensions, affects what the other
institutions of the constitutional order are willing to do. A
cultural theory of stare decisis will stop the Court from doing
much until the other institutions repudiate the regime
principles built upon the prior order's understandings.6'
Tushnet essentially believes that precedents acquire cultural
acceptance whether they are good constitutional law or not.62 The
role of the Court is to move the law past bad precedents toward a
better "constitutional order., 63 If the Court relies on the weight given
precedents by the culture at large, it will tend to refrain from
overruling in most cases. 4 Because Congress and the President are
also inclined to follow the expectations of culture, a cultural theory of
stare decisis will freeze the law.65 In sum, Tushnet argues that the
Court's constitutional role is to make law despite social and cultural
mores, and a stare decisis analysis that is highly deferential to those
mores conflicts with that role.66
B. William S. Consovoy
William S. Consovoy takes an opposite approach, viewing the
Court's analysis as overly flexible. He argues that the Court's
willingness to entertain reliance-based arguments outside of the
economic context is rooted in practical concerns. 67 In short, he
contends that the Court's stare decisis analysis has no real content
and that the opinions in Casey and Dickerson "are joined only in that
each achieved the result the majority ... wanted at that particular
60.

MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 93 (2004).

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Consovoy, supra note 12, at 56.
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moment, for their own particular reasons." 68 Consovoy notes that
turning stare decisis into a pragmatic "tool" rather than a limiting
principle has the effect of making precedents much easier to
overturn. 69 He believes that the Court's analysis ultimately comes
down to the question of whether overruling a precedent will be more
or less popular than upholding it. 70 The special justifications analysis
is simply a means to the end of maintaining the Court's legitimacy]'
Consovoy proposes that the Court cease making references to stare
decisis in constitutional cases, if only to match its words to its
71
actions.
C. Emery G. Lee
Emery G. Lee adopts a more conciliatory tone, arguing that the
Court's unwillingness to overrule reasonably-decided constitutional
precedents is a rational response to the contemporary political
climate.73
Lee admits that the demands of American culture
influenced the Court in Casey and Dickerson.74 However, Lee does
not see any constitutional problem in letting precedents stand-or
overruling them-in light of such demands, so long as there is room
for disagreement on the underlying constitutional question.75 Unlike
Tushnet and Consovoy, Lee sees nothing wrong with the Court's
concern with its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. 76 In fact, he notes
that cases like Casey and Dickerson do not arise in a legal vacuum,
but are instead battlegrounds between different "doctrinal schools"
espousing credible constitutional arguments.7 The Court must take
care to decide such cases without appearing to be acting politically,
and the special justifications analysis "will enable the Court to
provide a plausible and satisfactory explanation of its decision to
overrule a precedent. 7 87 Lee argues that the Court's recent emphasis

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 104.
Lee, supra note 31, at 619.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 609.
Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 864).
Id. at 609.
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on non-economic, societal reliance is tied to the fact that cases like
Casey and Dickerson deal with civil rights and liberties and not
economic issues.79 Thus, public perceptions and expectations
concerning those rights and liberties are a valid concern. 8° In sum,
Lee views the special justifications analysis as a reasonable means by
which the Court can protect its legitimacy.8 '
D. The Three Views Compared

There are two significant differences between the three
viewpoints. First, the degree of flexibility they allow the Court in
overruling its precedents. Second, the effects such actions have on
the Court's legitimacy. Tushnet views the special justifications
analysis as overly conservative, limiting the Court's ability to
effectively respond to new circumstances and giving too much weight
to the public's views.8' Consovoy views it as allowing the Court to act
in an unprincipled, pragmatic manner while hiding behind a
"legitimate" legal analysis. 83 Lee views the special justifications as an
effective means by which the Court may protect its legitimacy while
maintaining the flexibility needed to address changed circumstances. '
Tushnet and Consovoy argue, though from different points on the
spectrum of judicial activism and conservatism, that the Court is using
the analysis to hide its true motives. ' All agree, however, that in
adopting the the special justifications analysis the Court gave more
legitimacy to its application of stare decisis.8 The question is whether
the analysis is really effective to meet the Court's goal of legitimacy
and flexibility, or whether the older economic reliance analysis better
met those objectives. A closer look at the Court's use of the special
justifications analysis, and particularly its attention to societal
reliance, shows that the special justification requirement effectively
protects the Court's legitimacy while simultaneously giving the Court
the flexibility to allow the law to develop.
79. Id. at 617-18.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 609.
82. See TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 93.
83. Consovoy, supra note 12, at 105-06.
84. Lee, supra note 31, at 619.
85. See TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 93; Consovoy, supra note 12, at 105-06.
86. See TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 93; Consovoy, supra note 12, at 54-55; Lee, supra
note 31, at 582-83;
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IV. A Closer Look at Casey
The joint opinion in Casey reformulates the concept of reliance.
Instead of focusing on the economic cost, the Court looked to those
who rely on the availability of abortion in making decisions about
their lives.87 The joint opinion acknowledges that such societal
reliance by itself might not be enough to justify adherence to
precedent without the presence of other issues8 The Court further
noted that in cases like West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish89 and Brown v.
Board of Education,' in which societal reliance on an
unconstitutional legal rule favors upholding the rule, such reliance is
inappropriate as the sole justification.9 Thus, the Casey joint opinion
addresses and refutes Tushnet's concern that using societal reliance as
a limit on the Court's power to overrule precedents will prevent the
Court from overturning unconstitutional or inequitable precedents.'
On the other hand, where there is no change in the facts or legal
doctrine that led to a prior decision, the Court should generally not
overrule the prior decision, because doing so undermines the Court's
legitimacy. 93
This legitimacy is implicated in two interrelated
instances: first, in the broad sense, where the Court is so often
overruling itself that it comes to be seen as acting from political
motives; and second, in a very few cases in which a prior decision
"calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their
national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the
Constitution. "94
Both of these instances revolve around the public's expectations.
First, the broader legitimacy concern with the public's view of the
Court is aligned with the third special justification, which gauges how
changes in facts or circumstances have affected the public's view of
87. See 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992).
88. Id. at 861-66.
89. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and
holding that a state minimum wage law does not violate due process).
90. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1)(overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),
by finding that segregated schools violate equal protection).
91. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 861-66.
92. See TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 93.
93. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861-66.
94. Id. at 866-67. The opinion summarizes its legitimacy argument thus: "A decision
to overrule Roe's essential holding under the existing circumstances would address error,
iferror there was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's
legitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of law." Id. at 869.
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justice. Though too-frequent overruling of precedents tends to
undermine the Court's legitimacy, the joint opinion in Casey does not
prohibit the Court from overruling in particular cases when the case is
no longer thought to be a good decision. Instead, it is simply
recommitting itself to the general proposition that "[s]tare decisis is
usually the wise policy." 95 Note, however, that the public's views on
justice correlate directly to the amount of reliance the public has
placed on the precedent at issue, and thus a low level of societal
reliance on a precedent may indicate that overruling it will not greatly
affect the Court's legitimacy.
The second point is that the joint opinion's concern with societal
reliance also ties directly to the notion that certain cases involving
controversial issues should be given extra deference. The Court in
Casey would not have found societal reliance to be a factor in its
decision if it did not believe Roe to have had a substantial influence
on the behavior of a great many citizens.96 Likewise, the benchmark
for a controversy worthy of consideration under the opinion's second
legitimacy concern is Roe, "and those rare, comparable cases. '
Plessy and Lochner are comparable to Roe as such cases in the joint
opinion's view, and their potential for controversy must be at least
partly understood as deriving from their application to large segments
of the public. 98 The Casey Court wanted to ensure that overruling or
upholding a longstanding precedent would not be overly disruptive of
settled public expectations. Thus, the special justifications analysis
aims to balance the Court's interest in its legitimacy against its need
for flexibility in deciding whether to overrule precedents in light of
changes in facts, legal doctrine or public expectations.
If we examine Casey in light of the views of Tushnet and
Consovoy, we find that neither of their theories explains the Court's
behavior in applying the special justifications. Tushnet argues that
the Court uses stare decisis to refrain from responding to new
circumstances. 99 However, the Court does in fact respond to a new
factual situation, modifying the holding of Roe to reflect modern
scientific understanding but without undermining its legal
95. Burnet v. Colo. Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-06 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
96. Casey, 505 U.S. at 857.
97. Id. at 866.
98. See id. at 861-66.
99. TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 93.
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assumptions."° In effect, the Court finds a middle ground that adapts
its precedent without overruling it.' °' Tushnet's fear that a failure to
overrule precedents may freeze the law is unfounded here, because
the Court finds a way to prevent a misapplication of a legal principle
from standing, even while applying stare decisis effect.' O
Consovoy, by contrast, argues that the Court's special
justifications analysis allows it to achieve the result that a majority of
Justices would prefer, resulting in unprincipled decisions. However,
in Casey, the Justices who joined in the joint opinion agreed that the
standard in Roe needed adjustment while giving deference to its
understanding of fundamental liberties." '
The difficulty with
Consovoy's view is that to say that the Court in Casey was acting in an
unprincipled manner-having decided a priori the result it desired-is
to say that the Court in deciding Roe must have been similarly
unprincipled, because Casey upheld the legal principles Roe first
enunciated.' 5 Only when the Court overrules its precedent can it
substitute its own unprincipled view for the view of the earlier Court
that decided the precedent. Otherwise, it is simply affirming the legal
principles established in its precedent. Thus, Consovoy's argument
only applies to cases in which the Court strikes down a precedent.
Since the Court almost always upholds its precedents - this is the
default rule of principled stare decisis-Consovoy's argument is
inapplicable to the vast majority of cases. In Casey, as in most cases
involving precedents, the Court begins with the principle that its
precedent is presumptively valid."° Thus, Consovoy's argument also
does not satisfactorily describe the Court's behavior in Casey.
Emery G. Lee's view more accurately describes the Court's
analysis." 7 Lee argues that the Court uses stare decisis to carefully
100. The Court adopted the "undue burden" test to determine whether the state's
interest in fetal life outweighs the rights of the mother, replacing the "rigid trimester
framework" set in place by Roe. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
101. Id.
102. See TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 93.
103. Consovoy, supra note 12, at 56.
104. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.
105. Of course, Consovoy's argument logically extends to the Court's decisions in cases
of first impression as well, because there is no reason why a Court that uses an
unprincipled stare decisis analysis would not also engage in unprincipled decision-making
when deciding an issue for the first time.
106. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854.
107. See Lee, supra note 31, at 609, 617-19.
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navigate the streams of constitutional controversy, and that the
special justifications analysis allows it to justify its preferred landing
point to the public." The legal principles from Roe that the Casey
joint opinion upheld were permissible readings of the Constitution,
and thus are due much deference. '°9 Lee defends the Court's
concerns with its own legitimacy and with the current political climate
as justified, as long as the resulting opinion falls somewhere on a
continuum of constitutionally permissible outcomes.11 °
Lee's
argument applies more broadly even to cases of first impression-for
instance, the original decision in Roe arguably sat on the spectrum of
permissible readings of the Constitution as well.1" For Lee, the
flexibility of the Court's special justifications approach allows it to
reach conclusions such as that in Casey, in which the precedent is
upheld yet modified to fit new information.1 This flexibility is
necessary to allow growth in the law, but also allows the Court to pay
due deference to its precedents."' Lee's analysis describes very well
both the method and result in Casey, but it remains to be seen if
applies to post-Casey cases involving stare decisis as well.
V. A Closer Look at Dickerson and Lawrence
A. Dickerson v. United States
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Dickerson is
markedly different from the joint opinion in Casey, in that it namechecks reliance as a justification but in fact relies on other
justifications." 4
Chief Justice Rehnquist offers three important
observations on which he bases his opinion.'
First, he notes that
Miranda's holding has been scaled down in subsequent opinions
(many of them written by Chief Justice Rehnquist himself), but its
core-"that unwarned statements may not be used as evidence in the

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 609.
Id. at 619.
Id. at 617-18.
Id. at 619.
Id. at 617-18.
Id. at 619.
See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
Id. at 443-44.
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prosecution's case"-has remained intact."6 Second, he notes that the
Miranda warning requires little of police officers, while the proposed
alternative of a "voluntariness" test would likely prove unworkable." 7
Finally, he notes that "Miranda has become embedded in routine

police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of
our national culture."' 1 8 Thus, Miranda is upheld mainly because it

affords protection to a constitutional right-the right against selfincrimination-and is less burdensome and more workable than other

potential solutions."9 The first two justifications for the decision are
explained throughout the opinion, while the reliance argument is only

Chief Justice
articulated in a single sentence near the end.2
Rehnquist's statement about cultural reliance on the Miranda

warning thus only serves to buttress his main argument that the
constitutional right involved requires more protection than the
proposed alternative would give. Chief Justice Rehnquist is not
necessarily giving great deference to the "national culture."
Additionally, it is not completely clear just who is included in
Chief Justice Rehnquist's "national culture.. 2.
He cites Justice
Scalia's dissent in Mitchell v. United States, which argued that a rule's

acceptance by "the legal culture" was reason enough to not overrule
it.'2 2

He also cites with approval Chief Justice Burger's concurring
opinion in Rhode Island v. Innis, in which the Chief Justice notes that
"law enforcement practices have adjusted to [Miranda's]strictures. ' 3
116. Id. at 443-44. Chief Justice Rehnquist cites New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649
(1984), Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), and several other cases which all found
that the Mirandawarning was not constitutionally required. Id. at 437-38, 438 n.2
117. Id. at 444. Congress created the "voluntariness" test-in 18 U.S.C. § 3501-two
years after Miranda was decided. The test left it to the judge to determine whether a
confession was voluntarily, based on five factors. Though two of the factors considered
whether the defendant knew of his or her rights to remain silent and to assistance of
counsel, the absence of these factors would not preclude the judge from finding
"voluntariness." Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 435-36.
118. Id. at 443.
119. See id. at 444.
120. The bulk of the opinion deals with whether Congress's alternative protective
scheme is workable and whether prior decisions revisiting Miranda had completely
weakened its legal underpinnings. The comment about the national culture appears in the
third-to-last paragraph, after the principal arguments have already been made. See id. at
443.
121. Id.
122. See 526 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443 (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980)
(Burger, C.J., concurring)). Chief Justice Rehnquist cites Innis for the proposition that the
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The "national culture" that Chief Justice Rehnquist has in mind
appears therefore to be limited to lawyers, judges and possibly law
enforcement officials.'24 If so, an opinion that seems very deferential
to "societal reliance" at first glance is in fact quite conservative.
Chief Justice Rehnquist is in fact applying the special
justifications analysis to the case in a fairly uncontroversial manner.'25
As already noted, he views the Miranda warning as "workable," while
the proposed alternative is not. 26 He also notes that the legal basis
for the Miranda warning-the core understanding of the right against
self-incrimination-is still valid. 27 He does not mention whether the
factual circumstances on which the original Miranda ruling was based
are outdated, though the nature of the constitutional right involved
would seem to foreclose such an inquiry.' 28 The Chief Justice does, of
course, give reliance some weight, but, as noted above, it is unclear
whether he is weighing reliance by the public or by the legal
community. What is clear is that he considers Miranda presumptively
valid because it is a precedent, even though his treatment of the case
in the past suggests that he has not always viewed the warning as
constitutionally required. 29 In short, the Court applies the same basic
analysis as it did in Casey, though ultimately with less emphasis on the
reliance factor.
Chief Justice Rehnquist made three choices, however, that
combined to create confusion about the Court's stare decisis analysis.
First, he failed to explicitly cite Casey's special justifications analysis.
Second, he put his reliance-by-national-culture argument first when
summarizing his reasons for upholding Miranda, suggesting it was the
Court's leading rationale.'
Third, he failed to explain whether
Court should give a presumption of validity to Miranda, even though it might not now
reach the same result in the case. However, Chief Justice Burger's rationale appears to
mirror Chief Justice Rehnquist's own.
124. Id.
125. See Lee, supra note 31, at 614-15.
126. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444.
127. Id. at 443-44.
128. A change in factual circumstances that would no longer require protection of the
right against self-incrimination during arrest and interrogation is difficult, if not
impossible, to contemplate.
129. Justice Scalia points out in dissent that a majority of the Justices on the Court had,
in previous cases, stated that the Miranda warning was not constitutionally required,
including then-Justice Rehnquist in his opinion in Quarles. Id. at 445 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
130. See id. at 443.
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"national culture" meant the general public or the national legal
culture.13 ' These failures in explaining the Court's analysis are largely
responsible for the confusion about the special justifications analysis
that Dickerson has engendered.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Dickerson provides Tushnet
with his chief example of the Court's "departure" from a flexible
stare decisis analysis. 132 For Tushnet, the Court is abandoning its
responsibility to use stare decisis sparingly, in order to allow the law
to evolve. 133 As I have demonstrated, however, the Court in
Dickerson and Casey takes account of changes already visited on the
holdings of Miranda and Roe, respectively.' The Court in both cases
is simply defining the new limits of the holdings of those cases in light
of the limitations put on them by more recent cases. The Court is not
holding up cultural reliance as a deciding factor, but only as one
among several justifications for not completely overruling its
precedents. Thus, Tushnet is incorrect in assuming that Casey and
35
Dickerson spell the beginning of a "cultural theory of stare decisis.'
Consovoy's argument suffers from precisely the same problem,
in that it focuses too much on the societal reliance aspects of the
Court's decisions. Though it may in fact be true that the Court is
using reliance by the broader culture as a public relations tool, at least
in part, the fact remains that the opinions in Casey and Dickerson do
not depend on the weight of such reliance.'36 Instead, the Court views
other factors, such as change in either the factual or legal
circumstances or unworkability as more important. The Court may
well be using societal reliance as a means by which to sell its opinion
to the public, but this fact by itself does not compel the conclusion
that the Court is using its stare decisis analysis to push its own policy
agenda. As noted above, we would expect to see the Court
overruling precedents more often than it upholds them if Consovoy's

131. As noted supra, these cases are Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331-32
(1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger,
C.J, concurring).
132. See TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 91-93.
133. Id. at 93.
134. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992).
135. TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 91-93.
136. See Consovoy, supra note 12, at 55-56.
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view accurately reflected the Court's practice-but this has not
occurred.
Emery G. Lee's view, that the Court is reacting to the
contemporary political climate by creating a stare decisis analysis that
considers society's views, is more persuasive.137 However, Lee's
argument gives too little emphasis to the other justifications
employed by the Court. Indeed, Lee finds Dickerson's analysis "short
and under-developed," and suggests that the Court could just as
easily have overruled Miranda on the grounds that its legal basis had
been undermined by subsequent cases."' As I have noted supra,
however, the Court refrained from overruling Miranda chiefly
because the proposed alternative was not sufficient to protect a
defendant's right against self-incrimination.'3 9 Thus, Lee goes too far
in suggesting that the Court, after finding the "voluntariness" test
unworkable, could do anything other than uphold Miranda. It is
notable in this regard that Justice Scalia's dissent turns on his view
that the "voluntariness" test was in fact adequate-i.e., workable-to
protect the rights of defendants.' 4° Thus, the Dickerson case revolved
largely around the issue of the workability of the proposed
alternative, and not as much on any societal reliance on the Miranda
warning. Lee is probably correct to suggest that Chief Justice
Rehnquist included his statement about the national culture as an
attempt to give legitimacy to his opinion.14 Like both Consovoy and
Tushnet, however, he gives too little weight to the Court's other
justifications for its decision.
B. Lawrence v. Texas
As noted supra, the Lawrence Court tacitly employed Casey's
special justifications analysis. 142 The Court's principal reason for

137. See Lee, supra note 31, at 581.
138. Id. at 614-15.
139. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 ("[E]xperience suggests that the totality-of-thecircumstances test which § 3501 seeks to revive is more difficult than Miranda for law
enforcement officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner.").
140. Id. at 463 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141. Lee, supra note 31, at 615.
142. One commentator has noted that the Court's opinion in Lawrence "stresses the
incorrectness of Bowers and eschews a lengthy discourse directly regarding the doctrine of
stare decisis.... Casey and Lawrence are actually consistent in their reasons for
overruling, but this perceived inconsistency has been extensively debated in the national
media." Julie E. Payne, Comment, Abundant Dulcibus Vitiis, Justice Kennedy: In
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overruling Bowers was that its foundations had "sustained erosion
from our recent decisions in Casey and Romer.'' 43 Bowers was no
longer in accord with other Supreme Court decisions, state law,
current legal scholarship and international law.'" The opinion notes
that "Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not
correct today,"' 45 which echoes Casey's assertion that Plessy v.
Ferguson "was wrong the day it was decided.' 46 Only after having
established that Bowers stands on shaky legal ground does the Court
note that it "has not induced detrimental reliance comparable to
some instances where recognized individual rights are involved.' ' 47 In
fact, the Court finds that the anomalous nature of Bowers' holding
In effect, the Court
prevented it from inducing such reliance."
weighs the extent to which the legal community has, in this case,
declined to rely upon Bowers against the "individual or societal
reliance" it has engendered.'4 9 In other words, the Court distinguishes
between two kinds of reliance-reliance by courts and legislatures
and societal reliance. The Court looks mainly, as did Chief Justice
Rehnquist in Dickerson, to the national legal culture's reliance on a
precedent.'5 ° Finding none where Dickerson found a great deal of
reliance, the Lawrence Court then goes on to ask whether there is any
5
other reason not to overrule Bowers, such as societal reliance.' '
as a factor when there
Thus, the Court only looks to societal reliance
15 2
community.
legal
the
by
reliance
is little
Lawrence v. Texas, an Eloquent and Overdue Vindication of Civil Rights Inadvertently
Reveals What is Wrong with the Way the Rehnquist Court Discusses Stare Decisis, 78 TUL.
L. REV. 969, 1008 (2004).
143. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003) (citing Planned Parenthood of
Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996)).
144. See id.
145. Id. at 578.
146. Casey, 505 U.S. at 863 (discussing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
147. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
151. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
152. The majority's finding that courts and legislatures had not relied on Lawrence was
the central focus of Justice Scalia's scathing dissent. See id. at 589-91 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia cites numerous cases in both federal and state courts, as well as
state and federal laws, that relied on Bowers. Id. He cites these cases, however, as
showing substantial individual and societal reliance on Bowers, concluding "[w]hat a
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Lawrence's stare decisis analysis, because it tacitly employs
Casey's special justifications to overturn a precedent, presents a better

case for evaluating Consovoy's allegation that the Court uses societal
reliance as an unprincipled means to achieve the results it desires.'53
Justice Scalia's dissent extensively argues this exact point, charging

that "the Court has taken sides in the culture war.', 54

However,

Justice Scalia totally discounts the majority's valid-and principalargument that legal doctrine has changed in the years following
Bowers to render its outcome an anomaly among cases involving

personal autonomy in sexual matters. 5

For the majority in

Lawrence, the important factor in deciding whether society has relied
on Bowers is not the number of cases that have cited it, but the fact

that the public has received contradictory messages from the Court
on the issue of personal autonomy.'56 If the rationale for stare decisis
is that "it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled
than that it be settled right"-i.e., consistency is valued higher than
certitude-then the Court is simply bringing a wayward strand into
alignment with the bulk of modern substantive due process
doctrine.'57 For the Court, upholding Bowers and then having to
reconcile it with Casey and Romer would be more unsettling of both
kinds of reliance than to simply overrule it and bring the doctrine into

massive disruption of the currentsocial order, therefore, the overruling of Bowers entails."
Id. at 591 (emphasis added). Justice Scalia apparently fails to see the majority opinion's
distinction between reliance by the legal community and societal reliance. Thus, he
conflates the two to offer a highly illogical argument that, because lower courts have relied
on a Supreme Court decision-as they must under horizontal stare decisis-the "current
social order" has therefore relied upon it as well. Id. By advancing such an argument,
Justice Scalia's dissent inadvertently demonstrates the necessity of distinguishing between
reliance by courts and legislatures and societal reliance.
153. Consovoy, supra note 12, at 55-56.
154. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia goes even further
to assert that "[t]oday's opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a lawprofession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda ..... Id.
155. Id. at 587 (arguing that Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997),
undermined Romer and Casey in that Glucksberg held only fundamental rights "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" should receive greater due process
protection).
156. See id. at 577.
157. Burnet v. Colo. Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-06 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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harmony.158 Contrary to what Justice Scalia alleges, the majority is
not simply finding a means to its preferred end, but is trying to
reconcile contrary constitutional precedents in a manner least
disruptive to settled expectations.
The Lawrence Court's overruling of Bowers likewise directly
counters Tushnet's assertion that the Court will use societal reliance
on precedents as an excuse to uphold precedents rather than taking
"a leading role in changing one constitutional order into another."15 9
Instead, the Court recognized that Bowers conflicted with the
emerging constitutional right to personal sexual autonomy and struck
it down.'6
Emery G. Lee's view of the Court's consideration of societal
reliance as a proper means by which the Court protects its legitimacy
finds some support in Lawrence, but again fails to fully consider the
necessary role of the other justifications as counterweights.16 ' Lee
argues that the Court may justifiably choose to uphold precedents in
light of societal reliance if there is genuine disagreement about the
underlying constitutional question, in order to protect its legitimacy.'62
In Lawrence, the Court found little disagreement about the
underlying question, either in the United States or around the
world. 163 Having found no reason to uphold Bowers as a matter of
law, it then looked to societal reliance to see if there was a reason to
not strike it down and found none. 6" Thus, the fact that Bowers had
little support as a matter of law was the decisive factor in Lawrence,
and not its failure to engender societal reliance. Thus, what Lawrence
suggests is that societal reliance is more of a tie-breaker than a
decisive factor-it comes into play when there are more-or-less
equivalent legal arguments for upholding or overruling a precedent.
While Lee is correct that the Court may be considering its own
legitimacy when it invokes societal reliance as a special justification, it

158. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting from Planned Parenthood of Southeast
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1993) that "[l]iberty finds no refuge in a
jurisprudence of doubt.").
159. TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 93.
160. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74.
161. See Lee, supra note 31, at 581.
162. Id. at 619.
163. See generally, Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-77.
164. Id. at 577.
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has done so thus far only as a supplementary argument for upholding
or overruling."'

The arguments against the special justifications approach
typically revolve around whether a flexible stare decisis analysisparticularly one that allows the Court to consider societal reliance-

encourages the Court to insert its own cultural and political
preferences into the decision-making process. So far, this note has
argued that a more flexible approach that adds societal reliance on
prior decisions to the analysis in fact still tends to favor upholding

precedent, but gives the Court an additional and legitimate
justification for overruling precedents that no longer accord with
contemporary legal and social understandings. Further, the role of

societal reliance in the analysis has not been a prominent one in
practice-it has been viewed as a more decisive factor than in it has in

fact been.
The special justifications analysis is nuanced and
complex-as such, it is more suited to an increasingly complex world
in which contemporary cultural understandings increasingly inform
the content of constitutional law.' 66 One way to see this more clearly
is to look at how the Supreme Court analyzed its precedents before it

formulated the special justifications analysis.
VI. Looking Backward: A Comparison with the Economic
Reliance Approach

Any argument that the modern Court has changed its stare
decisis analysis must be evaluated with reference to the method it
employed in the past. If we look backward, we find that the Court's

special justifications analysis is no more, and probably less, subject to
the whims and policy preferences of the Court. The reason for this is

that the special justifications analysis, by forcing the Court to explain
165. One might wonder what the Court will do if presented with a precedent that, like
Bowers, has been little followed and seemed to conflict with other decisions, but, unlike
Bowers, has engendered significant societal reliance. In such a situation, Lee's argument
might have more application because it allows the Court to give determinative weight to
societal reliance. Thus far, however, in Casey, Dickerson and Lawrence, the Court has
declined to do so.
166. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding a law that
denied visitation rights to the natural father of a child); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978) (holding unconstitutional a law requiring individuals paying child-support to obtain
court permission to marry); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding
unconstitutional a housing ordinance that prevented some grandchildren from living with
grandparents). This line of cases, for instance, involves the problem of defining and
regulating "the family" in our complex, modern world.
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its rationale for its decisions and take several countervailing factors
into consideration, serves to keep the Court "honest."
A fine example of the Court's prior approach to stare decisis may
be found in the line of cases beginning with Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,16 7
and ending with Flood v. Kuhn.'6
In Federal Baseball, the
independent Federal League sued the National and American
Leagues under the Sherman Act for monopolistic practices. 69 The
Federal League argued that the other leagues, composed of eight

baseball clubs apiece, were engaged in interstate commerce when
their member teams crossed state lines to play one another. 170 The
Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Holmes, held that "the
business of giving exhibitions of base ball" is solely a state affair,

because mere transport is not enough to implicate interstate
commerce.1 7 1

The

opinion

was

in

line

with

contemporary

understanding of the extent of the Commerce Clause, and thus was
arguably correct when decided. 72

In 1953, two minor-league players petitioned the Court to revisit
its decision to exempt professional baseball from antitrust laws. 173 In
the intervening thirty years, the interstate nature of professional
baseball had changed dramatically. National and American League

teams bought minor-league "farm teams" through which they were
able
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

to

maintain

legal control

of

individual

players'

entire

259 U.S. 200 (1922).
407 U.S. 258 (1972).
259 U.S. at 207.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 208-09.

172. See G. EDWARD WHITE, CREATING THE NATIONAL PASTIME: BASEBALL
TRANSFORMS ITSELF, 1903-1953, at 80 (1996). Though this book is an academic study of

the history of baseball, its author is a legal historian and constitutional scholar, and
extensively discusses the Federal Baseball case. Id. He views the Federal Baseball
decision as legally orthodox, though lacking relation to reality given the large amounts of
broadcast money involved in professional baseball. Id. White notes that the principal
issue involved in the case and ignored by the Court was not the transport of players, but
the interstate market in player services. Id. A year after the Court decided Federal
Baseball, Chief Justice Holmes held, in Hart v. B.F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U.S.
271 (1923), that traveling vaudeville shows did implicate interstate commerce. Roger
Abrams, Before the Flood: The History of Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 9 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 307, 309 (1999). This inconsistency of result between two cases involving
traveling performers within a year's time may suggest that the Court gave baseball special
treatment.
173. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
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professional careers." ' Radio and television broadcast rights became
increasingly more valuable.175 Further, the "territoriality principle,"
by which certain clubs had exclusive rights to compete within
geographic territories, served to preclude the establishment of
competitive professional leagues.176 Given the drastic increase in the
amounts of money involved in professional baseball and the
increasingly monopolistic nature of major-league baseball-in
addition to the radical expansion of the Commerce Clause in the
to
intervening thirty years-one might have expected a challenge
177
FederalBaseball to be at least deserving of thoughtful discussion.
One would have been mistaken. In an extraordinarily brief per
curiam opinion joined by seven Justices, the Court cited the major
leagues' reliance on Federal Baseball and Congress' failure to
overrule it as compelling it to give full stare decisis effect to its
precedent.178 As Roger Abrams points out, the Court's deference to
Congressional inaction is particularly ironic, given that Congress had
a year earlier tabled hearings on the antitrust exemption specifically
in order to allow the Court to decide the issue. In any case, Toolson
gave absolute stare decisis effect to Federal Baseball's antitrust
exemption."
In 1972, Curt Flood, a prominent major-league outfielder,
challenged the major league reserve clause, arguing that the time had
come for Federal Baseball to be overturned.18 ' The reserve clause,
included in all professional baseball contracts, allowed a player's club
to indefinitely renew a player's contract, effectively maintaining
"ownership" of the player for his entire career and severely limiting
his ability to attain a higher salary.8 2 The majority opinion, written by

174.

WHITE, supra note

172, at 296-97.

175. Id. at 297.
176. Id. at 297-98.
177. Id.
178. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
179. Abrams, supra note 172, at 310. Abrams notes that the major leagues' counsel
argued before Congress that it should defer to the Court's ruling, and then disingenuously
argued before the Court that it should defer to Congress. Id.
180. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
181. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 264 (1972).
182. WHITE, supra note 172, at 49. For the actual text of the Major League Rules in
1972, see Flood, 407 U.S. at 259 n.1.
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Section I of the

opinion, entitled "The Game," offers a brief history of professional
baseball, but then devolves into a listing of Justice Blackmun's eightyeight favorite players.' 84 After recounting the legacy of Federal
Baseball through Toolson and beyond, Justice Blackmun concludes

matter-of-factly with a list of the factors relevant to the Court's
decision.8 8
The Court notes that, though baseball's antitrust
exemption is an "aberration," it is long-lived and entitled to stare
decisis effect.' 86 Further, the growth of broadcast media and the
increase in the amount of money involved in the game does not
require the Court to overrule FederalBaseball.'8 Most important-at

least judging by the fact that Justice Blackmun reiterates the point
throughout the opinion and then concludes on it-is the fact that
Congress had not acted to overrule the Court in the fifty years since

Federal Baseball.1 8 For these principal reasons, the Court declined to
overrule FederalBaseball and Toolson.'89
The fact that the Federal Baseball line of cases turns on a

statutory construction does not necessarily make a difference in the
application of stare decisis it is due. The Federal Baseball case turns

on the interpretation of the Commerce Clause, which was outdated
by the time the Court decided Toolson.'9° This arguably puts it in the
category of "cases involving the Federal Constitution," in Justice
Brandeis' oft-quoted formulation.' 9' Thus, it is possible to compare

183. Abrams calls it an "embarrassing display of sentimentality combined with rigid
adherence to notions of stare decisis." Abrams, supranote 172, at 311.
184. Flood, 407 U.S. at 263. Justice Blackmun concludes his roll-call by noting, "The
list seems endless." Id. Indeed, it does. In two footnotes to this section, Justice Blackmun
gives the full texts of poems by Grantland Rice and Franklin Pierce Adams. Id. at 263-64
nn.4-5.
185. Id. at 282-83.
186. Id. at 282.
187. Id. at 283.
188. Id. at 283-85. In 1998, Congress did in fact partially overrule the antitrust
exemption by passing the Flood Act. 15 U.S.C. § 27(a) (2000). The Act declared that the
exemption would no longer apply to the reserve clause, effectively outlawing it. Thus, the
exemption now serves only to maintain the "territoriality principle," preventing teams
from relocating without Major League Baseball's consent. See id.
189. Flood, 407 U.S. at 285.
190. See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357-59 (1953) (Burton, J.,
dissenting).
191. Burnet v. Colo. Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-06 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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the stare decisis analysis used in the Toolson and Flood with the
modern special justifications analysis. Such a comparison suggests
that the modern approach has many advantages over the traditional
analysis.
It appears likely that, had either the Toolson or Flood Court
employed the special justifications analysis, the antitrust exemption
would have been overruled. For one thing, the exemption was based
on a factual situation that had changed dramatically from 1922 to
1950 (and even more so by 1972), as professional baseball generated
greater revenues than ever contemplated by Justice Holmes.192 The
legal underpinnings of the exemption, based on the Commerce
Clause, also changed between 1922 and 1950.'9' Thus, two of the
justifications are directly implicated.
The exemption is not
unworkable in one manner of speaking, in that it had been in force
for twenty-eight years in Toolson and fifty in Flood and yet baseball
had continued and prospered. However, the Court might have found
it unworkable because it did not protect the rights of the ballplayers
who were prevented by the monopoly from putting their services on
the open market.9
Thus, there were several justifications for
overruling the exemption at the Court's disposal.
However, there would also have been the countervailing force of
the reliance of professional baseball on the exemption. Under the
analysis the Court employed in Toolson and Flood, the major
leagues' reliance on the exemption was not counterbalanced by other
considerations, such as unworkability or changes in facts or law.' 95
Had the Court weighed the changes in legal and factual
circumstances, it might not have found the case to be so simple.
Considering the drastic increase in the amount of money accruing to
the baseball clubs-and not to the players-as a result of the
192. See H.R.REP. No. 82-2002, at 5 (1952) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT], cited in
Toolson, 346 U.S. at 359 n.3 (Burton, J., dissenting). The Congressional report shows that
Major League Baseball made no money from broadcast rights in 1929, seven years after
FederalBaseball was decided. Id.
193. Cases such as Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(recognizing Congress' power to regulate public lodging under the Commerce Clause),
and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (recognizing Congress' power to regulate
public restaurants under the Commerce Clause), would certainly have allowed Congress
to regulate a professional sport governed by a national organization and played among
several states.
194. In fact, the reserve clause was not even addressed in Federal Baseball, further
calling into question the weight of the precedent.
195. Flood, 407 U.S. at 283; Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
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exemption, the Court may well have held that the there was good
reason to reconsider the question of whether baseball should be
governed by the Sherman Act.19 The comparatively perfunctory
analysis applied in both Toolson and Flood would not have been
acceptable under modern special justifications analysis." First, the
Court would have been required to actually explore the effects of the
growth of broadcast television and radio rights on baseball revenues,
instead of dismissing them outright.198 Second, the Court would have
had to address the expansion of the Commerce Clause, since the legal
basis for Federal Baseball had clearly changed since 1923.' 99 The
special justifications analysis thus would have been more protective of
the rights of the players, and would have allowed the Court more
flexibility to find an equitable solution.
Note also, however, the role that societal reliance plays in Flood.
The Flood Court gives much rhetorical weight to reliance by the
public on the antitrust exemption. Justice Blackmun's thumbnail
history of baseball in Flood, while not an argument as such, can be
seen as arguing that the tradition of baseball should not be disrupted,
for the sake of the fans.2 This is particularly true if the elegiac tone
of the opinion is considered alongside Justice Blackmun's contention
that baseball's exemption "rests on a recognition and an acceptance
of baseball's unique characteristics and needs." 20' Justice Blackmun
does not specify what it is about baseball that makes it "unique" and
deserving of an exemption from antitrust, but he does quote
extensively from the trial court's opinion."° The Court reproduces
the lower court's note that "[b]aseball's status in the life of the nation
is so pervasive that it would not strain credulity to say the Court can
196. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 192 at 5.
197. The Toolson opinion is, as already noted, only one paragraph. See 346 U.S. at

356-57. The Flood opinion, though it runs twenty-six pages, contains only four pages of
analysis-the remainder is largely a historical digression. See 407 U.S. at 282-85.
198. Flood, 407 U.S. at 283. Since, as noted in Justice Burton's dissent in Toolson,
there were no revenues from broadcasting when FederalBaseball was decided, it would
seem necessary to at least examine the issue briefly in Flood. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 359 n.3
(Burton, J., dissenting). However, the Court does not even explain how it reaches the
conclusion that broadcast revenues do not affect Federal Baseball's holding. Flood, 407

U.S. at 283.
199. Justice Blackmun never re-examines the Commerce Clause issue; nor had it been
re-examined in Toolson.
200.

See Flood, 407 U.S. at 260-64.

201.
202.

Id. at 282.
Id. at 266-67 (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
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take judicial notice that baseball is everybody's business., 20 3 Clearly,

the Court is well aware of and at least somewhat deferential to the
reaction of the public to any decision it might make that would
change the game.2 ' Additionally, the Court's deferral to Congress'
decision to not overrule the exemption is likewise a deferral to the
views of the public on the issue, as expressed in the electoral
process. 2 5 Thus, the Flood Court is effectively employing the kind of

"cultural theory of stare decisis" that Tushnet and Consovoy

deplore.2 °

Just as Tushnet warns, using cultural reliance as the

determining factor does in this case prevent the Court from moving
the law forward by applying the modern view of the Commerce

Clause to baseball. 27 Flood demonstrates that societal reliance is not
a new tool in the Court's kit, but also demonstrates the danger of
relying upon such reliance to uphold a precedent.

Conclusion
By comparison with more modern cases like Patterson,
Dickerson and Casey, that have considered the expectations of the
public, Flood is notable on the one hand for the mysteriousness with

which it handles the issue, and on the other for the apparent
deference it gives to societal reliance."l
The comparison
demonstrates that the value of the analytical framework provided by

the special justifications is less in their content than in their tendency
to require the Court to more fully address the issues at play in any
consideration of precedent. In other words, the special justifications
keep the Court honest. Thus, while Emery G. Lee is correct to note
203. Id. at 266 (quoting Flood, 309 F. Supp. at 797) (emphasis added). The rest of the
quoted paragraph is worth reproducing to show the great weight which the lower court
was willing to give to public opinion: "To put it mildly and with restraint, it would be
unfortunate indeed if a fine sport and profession, which brings surcease from daily travail
and an escape from the ordinary to most inhabitants of this land, were to suffer in the least
because of undue concentration by any one or any group on commercial and profit
considerations. The game is on higher ground; it behooves every one to keep it there."
Flood, 309 F. Supp. at 797.
204. It is not clear what sort of change the Court feared would result from a decision
overturning Federal Baseball. The closest it comes to an explanation is to say that it is
concerned about the "confusion and retroactivity problems that inevitably would result."
Flood, 407 U.S. at 283.
205. Id. at 281-82.
206. TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 93.
207. Id.
208. Flood,407 U.S. at 260-64.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 34:4

that the Court protects its legitimacy when it takes cognizance of the
reliance society has placed on a precedent, the Court is also
restrained from putting too much emphasis on societal reliance by the
requirement that it consider the other factors.2" Though the fears of
Consovoy and Tushnet that the Court may use the analysis to push
individual Justices' policy preferences, the more recent analysis

appears far less capable of such manipulation than the amorphous
21° Though at least one commentator has
analysis at use in Flood.
criticized the Court for damaging its legitimacy by not uniformly and
explicitly following the step-by-step special justifications analysis
outlined in Casey, 1' there are indications that the Roberts Court is
committed to doing just that."2 Employing that analytical framework
allows the Court to take into account important issues of societal
reliance, particularly "when a court is asked to overrule a precedent

recognizing a constitutional liberty interest. ' ' 21 3 At the same time, the
analysis counterbalances any potential that the Court may give such
interests too much weight by forcing the Court to consider other
relevant factors. On balance, the special justifications analysis is
more likely to result in well-considered outcomes than the more
open-ended and manipulable approach of the past.

209. See Lee, supra note 31, at
210. See TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 93; Consovoy, supra note 12, at 55-56.
211. See Payne, supra note 142, at 1008. Payne argues that "[b]y renewing its
commitment to the comprehensive Casey factors, the Court could avoid unnecessarily
causing such a backlash." Id.
212. See Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S.Ct. 2479, 2489-90 (2006). Moreover, Justice Stevens
argues essentially the same in his dissent in Randall, where he employs the special
justifications analysis to argue "for revisiting the constitutionality of statutory limits on
candidate expenditures." Id. at 2506-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Three Justices (Justices
Breyer and Alito and Chief Justice Roberts) joined the majority opinion, which employed
the special justifications analysis. Id. at 2485. Thus, if Justices Souter and Kennedy, who
joined the opinion in Casey, are added to the aforementioned four, a solid majority of the
Justices on the Court today appear willing to employ the special justifications analysis
when revisiting precedents. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
843-44 (1992).
213. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003). For an argument that recent
decisions by the Court to uphold or overrule its precedents may be reconciled by taking
into account "the impact of the previous decision on individual liberty rights," see Drew C.
Ensign, The Impact of Liberty on Stare Decisis: The Rehnquist Court from Casey to
Lawrence, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (2006).

